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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently on the books are dozens of laws mandating
approval by federal officials every time Indian tribes make certain
management decisions concerning their “trust” lands, such as
leasing,1 sale,2 or other real estate transactions.3 While there has
been a recent trend to free tribes from this federal yoke,4 we are
still a long way from true tribal autonomy in this area.5 Why can
Congress give these federal officials, most of them working for the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) within the Department of the
Interior, the authority to veto tribal actions relating to the
management of tribal lands and natural resources? The more
accepted understanding is that the political relationship existing
between the Indian tribes and the United States is said to be a trust
1.
See, e.g., Indian Long Term Leasing Act of 1955, 25 U.S.C. §
415(a) (2013); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 21012108 (2013); American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act of
1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3715(a) (2013).
2.
See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2013).
3.
See 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2013). Before the 2000 amendments to this
statute, the section mandated Secretarial approval for all transactions made
with Indians “relative to their lands.” The 2000 amendments narrowed the
need for Secretarial approval only for those contracts or agreements
“encumbering” Indian lands for 7 years or more.
4.
See, e.g., The Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible
Tribal Home Ownership Act, popularly known as the HEARTH Act,
(amending the Indian Leasing Statute, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2013)) and the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self Determination Act of 2005 (“TERA”),
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 119, Stat. 594, 763-79 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-06
(2013)); see also supra note 3, the amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 81.
5.
See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy

Development Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, But
Collectively Deficient Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Judith V.
Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problems of the
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91 (2012).
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relationship. Under this relationship, the United States is said to
hold tribal lands in trust for the benefit of the tribes. As the trustee,
Congress is said to have plenary power to manage the property of
its beneficiary, the Indian tribes.6
Some scholars have recently argued that the massive
amount of federal regulations, as well as the myriad of Secretarial
approval requirements, mandated in the name of the Indian Trust
doctrine is not only the by-product of paternalistic and racist
attitudes towards Indians, but is also a major impediment to
efficient economic development on Indian lands.7 Thus, there have
been suggestions from established federal Indian law scholars such
as Kevin Gover,8 and Stacy Leads,9 that the trust doctrine has been
a failure,10 and should be abandoned, or at least severely modified,
especially when it comes to control of Indian natural resources. At
least one commentator argued that recent changes in the law make
it ripe to revisit the legality of legislation such as the General
Allotment Act,11 originally enacted in 1887.12 These scholars take
the position that when it comes to management of Tribally owned
lands and control of tribal natural resources, the trust doctrine is
anachronistic and a serious impediment to both tribal selfgovernment and economic development.
While I generally agree with these scholars, in this article I
focus on providing legal arguments for challenging the validity of
See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
See Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling
Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290 (2009).
8.
Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century,
6.
7.

46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 217 (2006).
9.
Stacy Leeds, Moving Towards Exclusive Tribal Autonomy
over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439 (2006).
10.
See generally Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary
Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1185–89 (2014) (pointing to the
Indian Trust Doctrine as just one example of many where the notion of
governance by a fiduciary has failed).
11.
Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
12.
See Mary K. Nagle, Nothing to Trust: The Unconstitutional
Origins of the Post Dawes Act Trust Doctrine, 48 TULSA L. REV. 63 (2012)
(hereinafter Nothing to Trust).
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many of the statutes allegedly enacted by Congress pursuant to the
Indian Trust Doctrine. Many of the laws imposing federal control
over tribal land management decisions have their roots in the late
1800’s and early 1900’s. Congress was said to have absolute power
to manage tribal lands because such land was said to be held in trust
by the United States, and efforts to challenge such authority were
rejected based on the political question doctrine.13 In this article, I
argue that it is a mistake to think that the United States has actual
“trust” title to much of the 56 million acres comprising the tribal
land base.14 I also argue that it is wrong to take the position
Congress still has plenary, in the sense of being absolute, authority
over the land management decisions of Indian tribes.15
Furthermore, starting in 1974 with Morton v. Mancari,16 the Court
began to allow substantial judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge Indian-specific legislation and
eventually rejected application of the political question doctrine to
block challenges to Federal Indian legislation.17
At issue in the landmark Mancari decision was whether a
law giving preference in employment to Indians applying for jobs
within the BIA was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal
protection principle derived from the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process clause. The Supreme Court held that it was not. Crucial to
its holding was the finding that this preference does not constitute
racial discrimination because “[t]he preference, as applied, is
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”18 Since strict scrutiny
was not applicable, the Mancari Court concluded by holding that
13.
Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
14.
See infra notes 238-60. I first heard of such an argument from
Professor Robert Clinton during a presentation he made at Arizona State
University Sandra Day O’Connor School of Law in April 2011. See also
INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, NATIVE LAND LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (Thomson
Reuters, 2013-2014 Lawyers Ed.) [hereinafter Native Land Law].
15.
See infra notes 135-43.
16.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
17.
See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
18.
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.
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because the preference was “reasonably and directly related to a
legitimate, nonracially based goal,”19 promoting tribal selfgovernment, it would survive the equal protection challenge. As to
why the classification was not racial, the Court offered two
alternative explanations. First, it stated that the Indian Commerce
Clause authorized Congress “to regulate Commerce . . . with the
Indian Tribes,”20 and “to this extent, [it] singles Indians out as a
proper subject for separate legislation.”21 However, the Court also
explained in a footnote that “[t]he preference is not directed
towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies
only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to
exclude many individuals who are racially classified as ‘Indians.’ In
this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”22
Early on, scholars such as Professor David Williams
attacked the Mancari methodology as being unsound.23 The gist of
his criticism was that since Indian tribes require their members to
be of “Indian” ancestry by proving that they are direct descendants
from some biological Indian ancestors, Mancari was wrong in
asserting that the classification could not be racial. Invoking the
proverbial law requiring Indians to sit in the back of the bus,
Professor Williams insisted that Mancari did not offer Indians
19.
Id.
20.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
21.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 at 551–52.
22.
Id. at 553 n.24. Interestingly, before 1924, the year the Indian
Citizenship Act became law, most Indians were not United States citizens and
any classification based on membership in an Indian tribe could have been
held as being based on alienage and therefore be considered a suspect one for
the purpose of strict scrutiny. However, since at issue in Mancari was the
validity of a federal statute, heightened scrutiny would still not have been
required. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Dawavendewa v. Salt
River Project, 154 F.3d 1117 (1998), the Ninth Circuit held that a tribal law
giving preference to members of the Navajo Nation discriminated based on
national origin and therefore was in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibiting such discrimination. Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (2013)).
23. See David Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991).
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enough protection from laws that discriminated against them and
that there should be a presumption that most classifications of
Indians were, in effect, made on racial grounds. Others, notably
Professor Carole Goldberg, disagreed. Professor Goldberg noted
that Professor Williams’ approach would jeopardize most of Title
25, the Title of the United States Code containing most laws
enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians. As stated by the
Mancari Court, “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with
Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing
with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of
tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived
from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only
Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire
Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively
erased.”24 Rather than focusing and relying on the Mancari
footnote, Professor Goldberg argued that the better response to the
argument that any classification of Indians is primarily “racial” is to
argue that the special treatment of Indians cannot be considered
racial because Article I of the Constitution set Indians for special
treatment by authorizing Congress to regulate Commerce with the
Indian Tribes.25 Furthermore, Professor Goldberg added that
Indians could protect themselves from classifications harming them
by relying on the statement the Court made in Mancari that “[a]s
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgment will not be disturbed.” 26
In this article, while I agree with Professor Goldberg that
most classifications of Indians are not racial as long as they were
enacted into law pursuant to Congress’s power under the Indian
24.
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552; see also Carole Goldberg, Not
Strictly Racial: A Response to Indians as People, 39 UCLA L. REV. 169
(1991).
25.
Carole Goldberg, American Indians and Preferential
Treatment, 49 UCLA. L. REV. 943 (2002). Article I, section 8, clause 3 states
that Congress is given the power to “regulate Commerce among the states,
and with Indian Tribes and Foreign Nations.”
26.
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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Commerce Clause of Article I, I disagree with the notion that
Indians can successfully protect themselves from classifications
harming them by arguing that such classifications are not rationally
related to Congress’s unique obligations towards Indians. This does
not mean that Indians are left without any recourse to fight laws
that discriminate against them. This Article argues that the
Supreme Court’s new equal protection jurisprudence, as reflected
in cases such as United States v. Windsor,27 Romer v. Evans,28
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,29 and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,30 can be applied to Indian
legislation and protect Indians from laws enacted to their
disadvantage. While the Court in those four cases did not formerly
acknowledge that it was dealing with suspect or quasi-suspect
classes, it developed a jurisprudence under which laws denying
equal treatment to some groups can be more easily held
unconstitutional.31 Some scholars interpret these cases as creating a
heightened level of scrutiny,32 what some have called Second Order
Rational Basis Review,33 or Rational Basis with Bite (“RBB”). 34
Others have argued that these cases all involve legislation driven by
unconstitutional animus towards unpopular groups.35 Here, I will
argue that under either of those two theories, Federal Indian
27.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
28.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29.
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
30.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
31.
See Suzanne N. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 481 (2004) (noting weak and strong strands in the Court’s approach to
rational basis review. Id. at 512–18).
32.
In some way, this heightened level of review mirrors what
Justice Blackmun was trying to do in Mancari with his “uniquely tied to the
trust ” test but unlike his, my test does not restrict Indians to make arguments
related to the Indian Trust Doctrine.
33.
See Justice Marshall’s Opinion concurring in part dissenting in
part in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458.
34.
See Gale Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite:
Intermediate Scrutiny by any Other Name, 62 IND. L. J. 779 (1987).
35.
See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013); Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
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legislation imposing restrictions on tribal land management can be
successfully challenged as a denial of equal protection.
The Article will proceed as follows: Part II summarizes the
case law which has used equal protection to challenge Indian
legislation and set forth the various arguments that have been made
concerning when Indian legislation amounts to a racial or a political
classification; Part III explains why Mancari’s “rational tied to the
trust standard” is inadequate to protect Indians from laws
discriminating against them; and finally, Part IV explores the level
of scrutiny which should be used to challenge laws that are not
considered to involve racial classifications but nevertheless were
enacted based on a view that Indians were racially inferior, or were
based on other improper motives, such as animus towards Indian
people.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RACIAL AND
POLITICAL CLASSIFICATIONS

A. The Case Law at the Supreme Court
1. The Pre-Mancari Cases
Not surprisingly, cases challenging Federal Control of tribal
land and property before 195436 did not invoke the Equal
Protection Clause. These challenges usually failed because
Congress, as the trustee for the Tribes, was held to have absolute
power over Indian property.37 For instance, in Tiger v. Western
Investment Co.,38 Congress imposed more restrictions on the
alienation of lands by full-blooded members of a tribe than it did on
lands held by non-full-blood Indians. While the full-blooded
36.
1954 was the year Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), was
decided. In Bolling, the Court for the first time held that the Equal Protection
Clause applied to the Federal government because even though it is not
mentioned in the Fifth Amendment, it is incorporated through its Due Process
Clause.
37.
See, e.g., Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899);
Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
38.
221 U.S. 286 (1911).
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members challenged the restrictions, they never alleged
discrimination based on race. The Court held that as long as the
Indians were the wards of the federal government and under its
tutelage, it was for Congress, and not the courts, to decide what was
in the best interest of the Indians.
Whether cases like Tiger v. Western Investment should still
be considered good law after Bolling and Mancari is the subject of
this article. My argument is that they should not, although the one
case decided between Bolling and Mancari, Simmons v. Eagle
Seelatsee,39 shows the issue is not free from doubt. The issue in
Eagle Seelatsee was whether an Act of Congress restricting
inheritance in any part of the estate of a Yakima tribal member
held under restricted or trust status to those enrolled tribal
members possessing at least one fourth of Yakima Indian blood,
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs in the
case were arguing that the law discriminated based on race and was
a violation of the Due Process Clause because it bore no reasonable
relation to the guardianship the United States has over Indians.
Relying on the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribal
relations and property as enunciated in Tiger v. Western
Investment, the United States District Court upheld the law on the
grounds that “Congress was doing no more than defining what
constituted membership in the Yakima Tribes.”40 Interestingly, the
court seemed to acknowledge that the classification was based on
race when it stated, “[i]t is plain the Congress, on numerous
occasions, has deemed it expedient, and within its powers, to
classify Indians according to their percentage of Indian blood.
Indeed, if legislation is to deal with Indians at all, the very reference
to them implies the use of ‘a criterion of race.’ Indians can only be
defined by their race.”41 Nevertheless, the court still adopted the
lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, and stated,
“[n]ecessarily, continued intermarriage with white persons would
ultimately produce persons who were in no true sense Indians. At

39.
40.
41.

244 F. Supp. 808 (1965), aff’d without op., 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
Id. at 814.
Id. (emphasis added).
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some reasonable point a line must be drawn between Indians and
non-Indians.”42
In its last footnote, the court warned that a “logical
application of plaintiff’s position respecting the unconstitutionality
of ‘a criterion of race’ would cast doubt on the constitutionality of
all such legislation”43 dealing specifically with Indians. Among the
many statutes the court was afraid would be endangered were the
following: limitations on Indians making contracts without
Secretarial approval; limitations on the rights of white men
marrying Indian women; limitations on sending Indian children to
school out of state; and restrictions on leasing of Indian land
without Secretarial approval.44 This article argues that these
statutes should today be held unconstitutional and decisions like
Eagle Seelatsee overturned.

2. Mancari and its Progeny
Mancari’s major innovation and its departure from the line
of reasoning exemplified in Eagle Seelatsee was that the
classification of Indians did not have to be considered racial but
could be political. The Court started its analysis by announcing that
“[r]esolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status of
Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of
Congress based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a
“guardian ward” status, to legislate on behalf of federally
recognized Indian tribes.”45 It ended by concluding that laws
rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations towards the Indians
would not be disturbed.46
Ever since the decision, there has been a debate concerning
the meaning of this last sentence. Was the Court, as some scholars
were hoping, announcing a new Rational Basis “plus” test, under
which the special treatment of Indians could not be tied to any
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
Id.
417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
Id. at 555.
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legitimate federal interest, but only to Congress’s fulfillment of its
unique obligations towards Indians?47 Or, was the Court stating
that it was only when the legislation was tied to Congress’s unique
obligations towards Indians that it did not amount to a racial
classification triggering a heightened level of judicial review?
Finally, how did one determine when a law was “tied to Congress’s
unique obligations towards the Indians?” Congress’s unique
obligations towards Indians are hard to define because the trust
doctrine has many origins. Most scholars trace its beginning to
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous utterance in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia that the relationship between the United States and the
tribes resembled that of a guardian to its ward.48 Others, like
Professor Mary Wood, have argued that the trust doctrine emerged
from the huge land transfers that took place between the United
States and the tribes through treaties or Acts of Congress.49
Professor Robert Miller agrees the doctrine originated from land
transfers, but traces it to the land transfers that took place as a
result of the doctrine of discovery according to which the United
States obtained “ultimate title” to all Indian lands.50
Any discussion of the trust doctrine is further complicated
by the lack of consistent understanding of what the doctrine
actually is. According to Professor Mary Wood, the first version of
the Indian Trust Doctrine, devised by Chief Justice John Marshall,
was that the trust relationship between the tribes and the United
States was there to protect the continuing existence of tribes as selfgoverning sovereign entities.51 The second iteration of the doctrine,
however, developed during the Allotment era between the 1880’s
and the 1920’s, was not so benign to Indians.52 Its main purpose
47.
See Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
48.
49.

30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471 (1994).
50.
Robert J. Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered:
Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny, 166 (2006).
51.
See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49.
52.
See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913) (holding
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was to give plenary power to the federal government over Indian
land, natural resources, and people,53 beyond the limits of the
Indian Commerce Clause.54 In United States v. Kagama,55 the
Court famously stated “[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power.”56
In the years shortly following Mancari, the Supreme Court,
in four cases, had a chance to further explain its Mancari reasoning.
In all these cases, the federal laws at issue were upheld. The first
case in which the Court dealt with an equal protection claim after
Mancari was Fisher v. District Court.57 The Court held that a law
denying Indians access to state courts was neither racial
discrimination, nor a denial of equal protection. After stating that
“[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive
from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe,”58 the Court, citing
Mancari, concluded that even if this jurisdictional holding resulted
in denying Indians access to a forum to which non-Indians had
access, “such disparate treatment of the Indians is justified because
that the Pueblos of New Mexico qualified as Indians for the purposes of
having a trust relationship with the federal government because they were
“essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.”) Id. at 39.
53.
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee
Nation, 187 U.S. 294.
54.
Id. at 378-79. See also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the
Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247 (2003)
(arguing that in Mancari and other cases, the Court integrated the trust
doctrine into the Constitution so as to boost legislative power under the
Indian Commerce Clause and allow Congress to pass legislation for the
benefit of Indians even if such legislation went beyond “Commerce” with the
Indian tribes).
55.
118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
56.
118 U.S. at 383-84.
57.
424 U.S. 382 (1976).
58.
Id. at 390.
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it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”59
That same year, the Court also used Mancari to set aside a state
challenge to a tax immunity conferred on Indians.60 The state
argued that such immunity violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Relying on Mancari, the Court stated, “[t]he test
to be applied to these kinds of statutory preferences, which we said
were neither ‘invidious’ nor ‘racial’ in character, governs here: ‘As
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to Congress’s
unique obligation towards Indians, such legislative judgment will
not be disturbed.’”61
In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,62 a group
of tribal descendants who had been omitted from a per capita
distribution pursuant to a judgment of the Court of Claims sued
claiming discrimination and denial of equal protection. After
overruling previous cases that had shielded such legal challenges
under the political question doctrine, the Court nevertheless upheld
the law, stating that the Court of Claims’ omission of the plaintiffs
from the distribution list was “tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress’ [sic] unique obligation toward the Indians.”63 Although
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that the omission of plaintiffs
from the distribution was arbitrary and more the result of a
legislative oversight than “the product of an actual legislative
choice,”64 there was in fact a valid reason tied to the trust for the
omission: limiting the class of beneficiaries to Indians who were still
members of a federally recognized tribe having a trust relationship
with the United States.65 Although the Court used Mancari’s
language in a manner which suggested a higher level of scrutiny,
Justice Stevens’ dissent indicates that the majority could not have
59 . Id. at 391.
60.
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
61.
Id. at 480 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
62.
430 U.S. 73 (1977).
63.
Id. at 85 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
64.
Id. at 98.
65.
Id. at 85.
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used more than regular rational basis review, a hallmark of which is
to allow courts to come up with any kind of rational basis
supporting any possible legitimate federal interest without inquiring
further into the real motivations of the legislature.
In the next case, United States v. Antelope,66 the Court
never mentioned the ‘“rationally tied to Congress’ [sic] unique
obligations” test in upholding the law. At issue was a law that
subjected Indians to a federal criminal law containing a felony
murder provision which was not applicable to similar crimes
committed by non-Indians being prosecuted in state courts
pursuant to state laws. Unlike Mancari, this law was not favorable
to Indians since it imposed a stiffer penalty for essentially the same
crime when committed by an Indian instead of a non-Indian. Yet,
the Court found that “federal regulation of Indian affairs is not
based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is
rooted in the unique status of Indians as “a separate people with
their own political institutions.”67 The case is interesting because
after stating that “classifications expressly singling out Indian
tribes” does not involve racial classifications because it is “expressly
provided for in the Constitution,”68 the Court seemed to adopt the
position that any Federal law related to the “governance of oncesovereign political communities,” cannot be “viewed as legislation
of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians.’”69 In other words, the
Mancari framework seemed to have shifted to one where any
legislation aimed at the governance of tribes cannot be considered
“racial,” irrespective of whether it only applied to members of
Indian tribes rather than to all Indians. Furthermore, once the
legislation is found not to make racial classifications, garden-variety
rational basis seems to apply.70
One possible way to read Antelope as being consistent with
66.
430 U.S. 641 (1977).
67.
Id. at 646.
68.
Id. at 645.
69.
Id. at 646 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
70.
For instance, the Court stated “respondents do not seriously
contend that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so irrational as to
deny equal protection.” Id. at 647 n.8.
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Mancari is to take the position that the Antelope Court understood
Mancari to have used the “tied rationally to Congress’s unique
obligations” test because Mancari involved giving preference to
Indians in a non-reservation setting. The Mancari Court, therefore,
wanted to make sure that the law was related to the governance of
Indian tribes and was indeed enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause. In Antelope, where the law was only affecting
reservation Indians, and was so clearly related to the governance of
Indian tribes, it was not necessary to mention the “rationally tied to
Congress’ unique obligations” test.
The Court revisited this issue a couple of years later in

Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation.71 In that case, Indian plaintiffs were arguing that the
State of Washington’s implementation of Public Law 280, a federal
law allowing states to exercise some criminal jurisdiction over
Indians on Indian reservations, was so arbitrary and irrational that
it denied them due process and equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was complicated by the fact
that, unlike the previous three cases, this case involved a challenge
to a state law enacted pursuant to delegation of federal authority to
the state, an entity not having, at least initially, a trust relationship
with Indian tribes. However, the Court held that this did not matter
because “[i]n enacting Chapter 36, Washington was legislating
under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise of that
federal power.”72 In upholding the law against the equal protection
challenge, the Court did not dwell on why the law did not amount
to a racial classification and, citing only to Mancari, bluntly asserted
“[i]t is settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be
constitutionally offensive.”73 Having made that decision, the Court
used what it called a “conventional Equal Protection Clause
criteria,” and stated, “legislative classifications are valid unless they

71.
72.
73.

439 U.S. 463 (1979).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 500-01 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52).
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bear no rational relationship to the State’s objectives.”74 That
standard was easily met.
The last Supreme Court case directly evaluating the
applicability of Mancari was Rice v. Cayetano.75 At issue was
whether a state law restricting voting for selection of trustees to the
State’s Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Native Hawaiians, violated the
15th Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits voting
restrictions based on race.76 “Native Hawaiian” was defined to
mean people who could trace their ancestry to persons living on the
Islands before the arrival of the first European in 1778. The Court
held the voting restrictions unconstitutional because “ancestry can
be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.”77
The State tried to argue that under Mancari, the
classification of Native Hawaiians was not a “racial” classification.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found Mancari inapplicable
to the case at hand. After acknowledging that “Congress may fulfill
its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to Indian tribes by
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs,”78
Justice Kennedy found that although the classification involved in
Mancari had a racial component, “the preference was “not directed
towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians,’” but rather “only to
members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.”79 On the level of review
used in Mancari, Justice Kennedy summarized his interpretation of
the case by stating, “[b]ecause the BIA preference could be “tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward
the Indians,” and was “reasonable and rationally designed to
further Indian self-government,” the Court held that it did not

74.
Id.
75.
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
76.
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
77.
Rice, 528 U.S. at 514.
78.
Id. at 519.
79.
Id. at 519-20 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
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offend the Constitution.”80 Justice Kennedy also stated that the
reason tribal elections established by federal statutes can restrict
non-tribal members from voting was because these were elections
for the internal governance of quasi sovereign tribes while this case
involved elections to a state office, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
Although there were five Justices who signed the Rice
majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined
by Justice Souter, which offered a very different analysis. Their
concurring opinion took the position that the classification was
based on race because there was no “trust” for native Hawaiians,
and native Hawaiians did not “sufficiently resemble an Indian
tribe.”81 In other words, it seemed that for Justices Breyer and
Souter, the key element in deciding whether the classification is one
based on race was whether the legislation was enacted pursuant to a
“trust” relationship. Justice Stevens joined by Justice Ginsburg
wrote a dissenting opinion agreeing with Justice Breyer that the
existence of a trust relationship was the determinative factor in
deciding whether the voting restrictions amounted to a racial
classification. According to Justice Stevens, however, “[a]s the
history recited by the majority reveals, the grounds for recognizing
the existence of federal trust power here are overwhelming.”82
Among those grounds, according to Justice Stevens, was that the
United States came into possession of 1.8 million acres of land
expropriated from Native Hawaiians. After mentioning as another
factor the 150 laws enacted by Congress to implement its trust
duties that also included Native Hawaiians as Native Americans,
Justice Stevens concluded, “[t]he descendants of the Native
Hawaiians share with the descendants of the Native Americans on
the mainland or in the Aleutian Islands not only a history of
subjugation at the hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully
created and specialized “‘guardian-ward’ relationship with the
Government of the United States.”83
In conclusion, while four Justices agreed that the crucial
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 520 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
Id. at 525 (Breyer, J. concurring).
Id. at 532 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id. at 534.
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factor in determining whether a classification was racial was
whether the law was enacted pursuant to a trust relationship,
Justice Kennedy speaking for a majority of five was ambivalent on
that point. Although he mentioned that Congress does have the
power to “fulfill its treaty obligations” to tribes by enacting
legislation treating Indians differently,84 he also seemed to rely on
the fact that legislation dealing with Native Americans is not racial
when it is not directed to Indians as a group but “only to members
of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.”85
Rice, along with cases such as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,86 the leading case restricting the use of race in granting
preference in the acquisition of government benefits, gave hope to
some that Rice was announcing the imminent demise of Mancari.87
That did not happen, as the Court has not yet revisited Mancari
since the 2000 decision in Rice. Yet, because of a lack of conclusive
direction from the Supreme Court, the political versus racial
classification debate has been active in the lower courts. Some
commentators have recently remarked that Mancari and its
“political not racial” methodology has been under constant attack
both in the courts and by scholars.88 In response to such attacks,
some scholars have recently made the argument that the very
84.
85.

Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
Id. at 519–20. It is interesting to compare Rice with a later
case, Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004), which involved a
group of Native Hawaiians claiming that after Rice, a Department of Interior
regulation prohibiting Native Hawaiians from petitioning the federal
government to be recognized as an Indian tribe amounted to racial
discrimination since all other Native American groups in the continental
United States were eligible to petition the government for recognition as
Indian tribes. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating “the recognition of Indian
tribes remains a political, rather than a racial determination. Recognition of
political entities, unlike classifications made on the basis of race or national
origin are not subject to heightened scrutiny.” Id. at 1279.
86.
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
87.
See Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament
of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 736–43 (2001).
88.
Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The
Unrelenting Assault on Morton v. Mancari, 60-APR FED. LAW 47 (2013)
[hereinafter Apocalypse Now].
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dichotomy the Court made in Mancari, between racial or political,
was inadequate because the classification of Indians can be both
racial and political.89 Besides, encouraging courts to debate which
laws classify Indians based on race and which ones do not may
needlessly lead courts into unchartered and difficult territory with
no clear answers on how such determinations should be made.90
These scholars take the position that any laws enacted pursuant to
the trust doctrine for the benefit of Indians should be upheld
without the courts debating whether the classification is “racial” or
“political.”91 As the next section shows, however, the case law does
not endorse this view.

B. The Case Law in the Lower Courts
In the lower courts, the debate surrounding what laws
involve a racial classification has not centered on whether a given
law only affects members of Indian tribes or whether it affects all
Indians. Instead, determining whether a law amounts to a racial
classification has depended on whether it was enacted pursuant to
the trust doctrine, it affected “uniquely Indian interests,”92 or it was
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. In all the cases,
whether the law only applies to Indians on Indian reservations or
extends beyond reservation borders is an important factor. Laws
only applying on reservations, as was the case in Antelope, will in
all likelihood be considered non-racial classifications, and will
therefore be upheld. Laws regulating or benefiting Indian tribes or
their members beyond the reservation borders, as was the case in
Mancari, are more difficult to assess when it comes to determining
if they involve racial classifications. The problem with this view is
that the two sources of congressional power most frequently cited
89.
See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian
Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011).
90.
See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and
Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165 (2010).
91.
See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership,
and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012).
92.
See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997).
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as granting power to Congress over Indian affairs, the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Indian Trust Doctrine, do not contain
any territorial limitations on the extent of congressional power.
This was made clear in a couple of early cases, the first one using
the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of power, the other one
the Indian Trust Doctrine.
One of the first Supreme Court cases recognizing
congressional power beyond the reservation’s border was United
States v. Holliday:93
If Commerce, or traffic, or intercourse, is carried on
with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe,
it is subject to be regulated by Congress, although
within the limits of a State. The locality of the traffic
can have nothing to do with the power. The right to
exercise it in reference to any Indian tribe, or any
person who is a member of such tribe, is absolute,
without reference to the locality of the traffic, or the
locality of the tribe, or of the member of the tribe
with whom it is carried on.94

93.
70 U.S. 407 (1865).
94.
Id. at 418. Some States have made a concerted effort to
challenge congressional power over Indian Affairs beyond the reservations’
borders by invoking the Tenth Amendment which states that “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” However,
except for one state court decision, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Super. Ct., 148 P.3d 1126 (Cal. 2006), which involved tribal violations of state
election laws, these efforts have failed. See Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp.
2d 130, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Carcieri v.
Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180 (D.R.I. 2003), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Prairie Band of Potawatomi v.
Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818, 829 (10th Cir. 2007). Although some courts have held
that without the Existing Indian Family doctrine, some parts of ICWA would
be in violation of Tenth Amendment, see In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Reptr. 2d
692, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), this position has not been endorsed by the vast
majority of courts that have considered the issue. See infra notes 122–29.
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The second case, Perrin v. United States,95 concerned federal
power to prohibit liquor in areas once occupied, but subsequently
ceded, by an Indian tribe. Although the Perrin Court found some
limits to congressional power in areas no longer part of Indian
Country, it nevertheless reaffirmed federal power in the case:
As the power is incident only to the presence of the
Indians and their status as wards of the government,
it must be conceded that it does not go beyond what
is reasonably essential to their protection, and that,
to be effective, its exercise must not be purely
arbitrary, but founded upon some reasonable basis.96
A good example of the “on” versus “off” Indian land
dichotomy is provided by contrasting two Ninth Circuit decisions,
both originating from Alaska. At issue in Alaska Chapter v.
Pierce,97 was a regulation issued by the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) directing Indian
housing authorities building low-income housing in remote Native
American villages to give preference to Indian owned enterprises in
awarding federal contracts. The lawsuit alleged that this preference
violated equal protection. The district court agreed, construing
Mancari’s political classification as applying only to laws designed
to further tribal self-government.98 After rejecting this
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[i]f
the preference in fact furthers Congress’s special obligation, then a
fortiori it is a political rather than racial classification, even though
racial criteria might be used in defining who is an eligible Indian.”99
Having thus defined the test to distinguish racial from political
classifications, the court had no trouble concluding that the
regulation was rationally related to Congress’s fulfillment of its
95.
232 U.S. 478 (1914).
96.
Id. at 486.
97.
Alaska Ch., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v.
Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
98.
Id. at 1167.
99.
Id. at 1169.
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trust responsibility since its purpose was to encourage and develop
leadership skills among Indian-owned businesses to “help the
Indians develop economic self-sufficiency.”100 In other words, the
court seemed to agree with the district court that Mancari’s
“rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations” test determined
whether the classification was racial or political. However, while the
district court took an extremely narrow view of what is or is not
related to implementing the trust, the Court of Appeals adopted a
much more expansive definition, stating that “[t]he Ninth Circuit
has applied Mancari to Indian interests broader than selfgovernment.”101 On the date of the decision, 1982, activities
occurring in Native Alaskan Villages were still considered as taking
place on Indian lands. This would no longer be the case after the
Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Alaska v. Native Village. of
Venetie Tribal Government, which held that lands reserved to
Alaskan Native entities under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA) did not qualify as Indian Country.102
While pretending not to disagree with Alaska Chapter,
Judge Kozinski adopted a much different approach a few years
later in Williams v. Babbitt.103 At issue in the case was the
correctness of an administrative court’s interpretation of the
Reindeer Industry Act, which interpreted the statute as prohibiting
non-Native Alaskans from entering the Reindeer industry. Relying
heavily on Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and Justice Stevens’
dissent in that case,104 the Ninth Circuit found that because the
administrative interpretation allowed a racial preference for
100. Id. at 1170.
101. Id. at 1169.
102. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). Thus, in Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42
F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1998), the court held that Alaska Native
preference in employment ordinance issued by a subdivision of the State of
Alaska was a racial preference subject to strict scrutiny.
103. 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
104. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). After remarking that in Adarand, Justice
Stevens had argued that the majority equated the discrimination against
African Americans with the preference given to Indians, Judge Kozinski
concluded, “[i]f Justice Stevens is right about the logical implications of
Adarand, Mancari’s days are numbered.” Id. at 244.
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Indians subject to strict scrutiny, it created a serious constitutional
doubt as to the validity of the statute. Therefore, invoking the
constitutional avoidance rule,105 the Circuit held that it did not have
to give deference to the administrative interpretation, and opted to
construe the statute as not creating such preference. In order to
come to this holding, Judge Kozinski had to first find that the
classification was racial and not political. While acknowledging that
“Mancari is not necessarily limited to statutes that give special
treatment to Indians on Indian land,”106 the court limited Mancari’s
reach as “shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian
interests.”107
The question after Williams was: what exactly is a law
“affecting uniquely Indian interests?” Judge Kozinski stated,
“[l]egislation that relates to Indian land, tribal status, selfgovernment or culture passes Mancari’s rational relation test
because “such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as
‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions.”108
Attempting to normatively justify this limitation, Judge Kozinski
stated that “[a]s ‘a separate people,’ Indians have a right to expect
some special protection for their land, political institutions . . . and
culture.”109 This is not much in terms of normative justifications,
although one scholar has picked up the challenge, and gave a much
more involved and detailed justification for this limitation on
Mancari’s reach.110 Judge Kozinski ended that part of the analysis
by announcing, “we seriously doubt that Congress could give
Indians a complete monopoly on the casino industry or on space
105. This is the canon of statutory construction according to which
statutes are supposed to be interpreted, if at all possible, so as to avoid serious
doubts as to their constitutionality.
106. 115 F.3d at 665.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 664 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646
(1977)).
109. Id.
110. See David Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 22 (making
a constitutionally based argument that only statutes which regulate Indians as
distinct and separate Peoples do not amount to racial classifications. All other
Indian classifications do and should be subject to strict scrutiny).
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shuttle contracts.”111 As examined next, two later circuit court
cases, one by the Ninth Circuit, disagreed with that evaluation.
The legitimacy of casino monopoly was at play in Artichoke
Joe’s v. Norton.112 At issue in that case was a challenge by a nonIndian casino owner to a California law granting a monopoly over
certain types of casino gaming to Indian tribes. The main question
was whether the classification was racial or political.113 The Ninth
Circuit had to address the different approaches in its previous
decisions in Alaska Chapter and Williams. After acknowledging
that the court in Alaska Chapter “suggested that, so long as a
federal statute evinced a rational relationship to Congress’s trust
obligations towards Indians, it involved a political classification,”114
it remarked that in Williams, it had “more recently . . . suggested
that the political-versus-racial classification is not always easy to

111. Williams, 115 F.3d at 665.
112. Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712
(9th Cir. 2003).
113. The other main issue was whether Mancari controlled since
this involved a state and not a federal law. The Court held that because the
state law was directly enacted pursuant to a federal law, the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2013), under the previous
Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), Mancari was applicable. See
supra notes 56–59. A more critical perspective was recently adopted by the
First Circuit in KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012), where the Court overturned the dismissal of a complaint filed by a nonIndian gaming concern arguing that the State law allowing only Indian tribes
to negotiate gaming compacts with the State constituted race based
preference. Distinguishing both Artichoke Joe’s and Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes because in this case the Tribe did not, and
may never, possess what IGRA defined as Indian lands, the Court stated that
“[i]t would be difficult to conclude that the IGRA ‘authorizes’ the
Massachusetts statute under these circumstances—where there are no Indian
lands in Region C at present within the meaning of IGRA.” Patrick, 693 F.3d
at 21. The Court therefore concluded by stating “We simply cannot say that
KG’s equal protection claim as to section 91 fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” Id. at 27.
114. Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 734.
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identify.”115 The court went on to distinguish Williams on the
grounds that here the preference was given pursuant to the federal
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),116 that the statute only
affected Indian tribes, rather than individual Indians, and only
pertained to activities on Indian lands. Thus, the court ended by
stating that because “IGRA pertains to Indian lands and to tribal
self-government and tribal status of federally recognized tribes, . . .
under Mancari, rational-basis review applies.”117 Describing Judge
Kozinski’s reference to casino monopoly as dictum, the court
nevertheless adopted his approach, implicitly recognizing that
William’s “uniquely Indian interests” limitation covered any statute
“relating to tribal self-government, to tribal status, or to Indian
lands.”118
One of the questions left open after the case was whether
any statute covering non-reservation based activities would have to
be tied to tribal self-government in order to avoid strict scrutiny. A
year later, in American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States,119 the D.C. Circuit had to decide such a case which
also involved something similar to the second example given by
Judge Kozinski, government contracts involving the space shuttle.
At issue was the constitutionality of a provision in the Defense
Appropriations Act granting outsourcing preference to tribally
owned defense contractors. The case was more difficult than
previous cases because the preference extended beyond Indian
activities on or near reservations, and it did not seem to involve
tribal self-government, at least not directly, or for that matter,
uniquely Indian interests. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
law stating:

115. Id.
116. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
117. Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 736. Artichoke Joe’s was followed
by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Garrett, 122 Fed. App’x. 628 (4th Cir.
2004).
118. Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 735.
119. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330
F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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The critical consideration is Congress’ power to
regulate commerce “with the Indian tribes.” While
Congress may use this power to regulate tribal
members, regulation of commerce with tribes is at
the heart of the Clause, particularly when the tribal
commerce is with the federal government, as it is
here. When Congress exercises this constitutional
power it necessarily must engage in classifications
that deal with Indian tribes.120
The difference between the D.C. Circuit’s approach in this
case and the Ninth Circuit’s is that it based its ruling strictly on the
constitutional text and the power Congress derived from the Indian
Commerce Clause. The court did not put any emphasis on
determining whether the classification was racial or political, or
based on whether it was enacted pursuant to congressional trust
obligations because it affected uniquely Indian interests.
Challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) in
cases involving Indian children located off Indian reservations have
also involved interesting equal protection arguments.121 ICWA is
the most far-reaching congressional legislation protecting tribal
interests beyond reservation borders.122 For instance, ICWA allows
for concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction for child custody
proceedings involving an Indian child even when such child does
not reside on the reservation. In addition, the law allows for
transfer of such cases from state to tribal courts in the absence of
good cause or objections by either parent. The Act also mandates
an Indian placement preference even when the state court keeps
jurisdiction over such cases.
Some states have fought application of ICWA in cases
where there is no “Existing Indian Family,” on the grounds that in
the absence of such a family, the law amounts to a violation of
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 521-22.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (2012).
See generally Patrice Kunesh, Border Beyond Borders—

Protecting Essential Tribal Relations off Reservations Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 42 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 15 (2007).
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substantive due process, equal protection, and is in contravention of
the rights guaranteed to the States under the 10th Amendment of
the Constitution.123 The equal protection argument, as stated in In
re Bridget R., is based on the fact that “any application of ICWA
which is triggered by an Indian child’s genetic heritage, without
substantial social, cultural, or political affiliations between the
child’s family and a tribal community, is an application based solely,
or at least predominantly, upon race and is subject to strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.”124 This line of reasoning is
subject to the criticism that under the Act, an “Indian child” is
defined as a child who is a tribal member or who is eligible for
membership in a tribe. Therefore, the Act conforms with Mancari’s
holding that the classification is not racial when it only affects
Indians who also are tribal members. Perhaps this is the reason why
a court in In re Santos Y., another California case adopting Bridget
R’s equal protection analysis, also concluded that more recent cases
“have focused on the text of Mancari, rather than on the footnote
language that characterized the BIA preference as more political
than racial, and have limited application of the rational basis test to
legislation involving uniquely Indian concerns.”125 Citing Judge
Kozinski’s analysis in Williams v. Babbitt,126 the court went on to
conclude, without giving any kind of explanation, that “we . . . do
not find child custody or dependency proceedings to involve
uniquely Native American concerns.”127 Child custody proceedings,
generally speaking, are, of course, not “uniquely” an Indian
concern. However, it seems disingenuous to argue that child
custody proceedings involving only Indian children who are tribal
members or eligible for tribal membership are not a uniquely tribal
123. The leading case advocating the requirement of an existing
Indian family before ICWA can be applied is In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App.
4th 1483 (Cal Ct. App. 1996).
124. Id. at 1509. The court went on to find that without an existing
Indian family to protect, the Act did not protect a compelling governmental
interest by narrowly tailored means.
125. In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Reptr. 2d at 730.
126. 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
127. In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
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interest. Professor Kunesh put it well when, after observing that the
unique tribal interest in its Indian children “coalesces with the
essentiality of tribal governance in child welfare matters, to
compose an uber-tribal interest that transcends territorially-defined
jurisdictional limits,”128 she concluded that “[t]he welfare of Indian
children lies at the heart of tribal sovereignty.”129
The debate surrounding the need for an “existing Indian
family” in order for the classification not to be considered “racial”
shows the difficulty in basing the level of scrutiny on whether the
classification is “political” or “racial.” As stated earlier, this article
is arguing that the determination of whether a classification is racial
or not should be based on whether the legislation containing the
classification was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause. If it was, the classification cannot be racial. Otherwise it is.
In this vein, Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in the most recent
Supreme Court case involving ICWA, Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl,130 while coming to the wrong conclusion, is at least more on
track concerning how these equal protection challenges should be
decided. While the attorneys for the Adoptive Couple made
arguments relating to the fact that there was no “existing Indian
family” in this case, Justice Thomas seemed to have disregarded
these arguments and instead concurred in the holding that ICWA
was not applicable in this case but only because he believed that
Congress did not have the power under the Indian Commerce
Clause to enact such legislation. Firmly asserting that Congress
does not have plenary power over Indian affairs, Justice Thomas
took an incredibly narrow view of the Indian Commerce Clause.131
Quoting from other cases and scholarly articles, Thomas agreed
that:

128. Kunesh, Borders Beyond Borders, supra note 122, at 51.
129. Id. at 78.
130. 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (Thomas, J. concurring).
131. Justice Thomas seemed to have adopted the views espoused by
Professor Robert G. Natelson in The Original Understanding of the Indian
Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007), since the article is cited
and quoted throughout his concurring opinion.
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At the time the original Constitution was ratified,
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.
. . . [T]he term “commerce with Indian tribes” was
invariably used during the time of the founding to
mean “‘trade with Indians.’” . . . [R]egulation of
Indian commerce generally referred to legal
structures governing “the conduct of the merchants
engaged in the Indian trade, the nature of the goods
they sold, the prices charged, and similar matters.”132
Justice Thomas concluded, therefore, that Congress had no
power to enact the section of ICWA at issue in the case because
first, the statute dealt with child custody proceedings, not
commerce, and secondly, the Constitution gave Congress only the
power to regulate Commerce with Indian tribes. Yet, according to
Thomas “the portions of the ICWA at issue here do not regulate
Indian tribes as tribes” since it applied to “all child proceedings
involving an Indian child regardless of whether an Indian tribe is
involved. This case thus does not directly implicate Congress’s
power to “legislate in respect to Indian tribes.”133 While I agree
with Justice Thomas that Congress should not be considered to
have “plenary power” when it comes to its assertion of power over
Indian tribes, I believe that Congress has “plenary” authority over
“Indian Affairs” vis-à-vis the states. I also disagree that the
legislation has to directly regulate the tribes.134

132.

133 S. Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Natelson,

supra note 131, at 216, 216 n.99) (internal citations omitted).
133. Id. at 2570 (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004)) (emphasis in original).
134. For an eloquent argument that Congress does have the power
to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act, see MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, ICWA
and The Commerce Clause, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT AT 30 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona F. Singel & Kathryn
E. Fort eds., 2008).
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C. The Indian Commerce Clause Power as the Determinant Factor
on Whether the Classification is Racial or Political
This article takes the position that whether the classification
is racial or political should be based on whether, in enacting the
legislation containing the classification, Congress has legislated
under its Indian Commerce Clause power. This argument, however,
presupposes some limits on this Congressional power. The problem
with the majority of current Supreme Court Justices’ understanding
of Congress’s power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is that
they take the complete opposite position as that of Justice Thomas.
They do not see the Indian Commerce Clause as having any
internal limitations. Instead, other provisions of the Constitution
impose such limits externally. Thus, the Court continues to insist
that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian Affairs.”135 So, applying the Court’s current view to my
thesis, as long as the legislation concerns the “field of Indian
Affairs,” such legislation cannot be considered “racial.” Such
position sweeps too broadly and would shield too much legislation
from strict scrutiny.
Under the Court’s current view, “plenary” does not mean
“absolute” power over tribal resources in that Congress cannot
deny tribes their constitutional rights to vested property rights
unless the law is enacted pursuant to the trust doctrine and is truly
for the benefit of the Tribes. Thus, the Court in United States v.
Sioux Nation had to decide whether the taking of the Black Hills
from the Sioux in 1877 was done pursuant to the trust relationship,
or pursuant to Congress’s power of eminent domain in which case
the Sioux were owed just compensation within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. While acknowledging that Congress can act
beyond normal constitutional restrictions if acting as a trustee for
the tribes, the Court also held that when Congress is not acting as a
trustee, legislation should be subject to constitutional restrictions.136
135.

See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192

136.

448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (“[T]his power to control and manage

(1989).
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In other words, under the modern view, the Court may still decide
to uphold congressional legislation violating other parts of the
Constitution if such legislation is truly for the benefit of the tribes.
Professor Clinton once wrote that the Commerce Clause
gives Congress the “power to regulate commerce with the tribes,
not the commerce of the tribes.”137 Once we accept that neither
Congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause nor
power emanating from the treaties previously entered with Indian
tribes is plenary in the sense of absolute, we must still determine
the extent of this power.138 Regulating “Commerce” with Indian
tribes goes beyond regulation of commercial trade with the tribes.
As Chief Justice Marshall once stated, Commerce is
“intercourse,”139 and as some scholars have noted, the original 1790
Trade and Intercourse Acts regulated much more than just “trade”
with the Indians.140 Professor Matthew Fletcher recently argued
that the Indian Commerce Clause “should be interpreted broadly
to include subject matters beyond the narrow meaning (whatever it
may be) of Commerce.”141 Professor Fletcher has also argued that
the Indian Commerce power was in fact conceived as extending to
every interaction, social or commercial, between Indians and non-

[is] not absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting
and advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitations inhering in . . . a
guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.” Id. (citing United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)).
137. Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for
Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 259 (2002) (emphasis added).
138. See Philip P. Frickey, Native American Exceptionalism in
Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 473-75 (2005) (arguing that
abandoning plenary power would still leave a great amount of power to
Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause and the spending clause).
139. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
140. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24
(2010). Balkin also noted that the constitutional convention originally voted to
give Congress power to regulate “affairs” with the Indians and there is no
evidence “that the shift from ‘affairs’ to ‘commerce’ was thought to change the
meaning or the scope of the powers granted.” Id. at 23 n.82.
141. See Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, supra note
134.
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Indians.142 This does not mean, however, that the power is
unlimited. In subsequent writings, Professor Fletcher drew a
distinction between congressional power over the tribes’ external
affairs, which he acknowledged as plenary, and power over the
tribes’ internal affairs, which he argued should not be.143
In conclusion, while Congress may enact legislation
regulating commerce, relations, and interactions between Indians
and non-Indians, it should not be able to enact laws regulating
Indian tribes or their lands in areas having nothing to do with such
interactions. In other words, Congress should not be able to
regulate internal tribal commerce. Under my thesis, all such
congressional regulations should be considered racial classifications
and strict scrutiny should be applicable. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has never endorsed such internal limits on the
Indian Commerce Clause. As previously stated, Professor Carole
Goldberg argued that even if one adopted a broad view of the
Indian Commerce power, not classifying any such law as making
racial classifications was inconsequential because Indians could
protect themselves from laws negatively affecting them by invoking
the Mancari’s trust standard. Under that standard, the legislation in
question would only be upheld if it was tied to Congress’s unique
142. Other scholars are agree, noting the early Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act regulated much more than commercial trade between nonIndians and the Indian tribes, See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 140, at 24.
Others disagree. See Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the
Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010) (arguing that the Trade and Intercourse Acts were
mostly enacted pursuant to the Treaty Power and not the Commerce Power).
143. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN J. CIV.
RTS. & CIV. LIB 45, 75–78 (2012). In his upcoming article, Gregory Ablavsky
argues that the drafters of the Constitution never understood the Commerce
Clause as being a large part of the total power given to Congress over Indian
affairs, let alone the exclusive one. Instead, the Indian Commerce Clause was
just a component of a broad Indian Affairs power resting on multiple
constitutional provisions. However, even though the constitutional power of
the United States over Native nations was broad, it was not considered
plenary by the drafters or other federal officials. See Gregory Ablavsky,
Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).
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trust responsibilities towards Indians. In the next Part, I argue that
the “tied to the trust obligations” standard is not workable, and that
tribal advocates should therefore look elsewhere for protection.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A
LIMIT ON FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIAN TRIBES
Although the Court in the modern era seemed to have
taken the position that the Commerce Clause more than the trust
doctrine gives Congress plenary authority over Indian Affairs,144
the Indian Trust Doctrine is still cited as a source of plenary power
for Congress. Through the years, Congress has used this power
extensively to control and manage the tribes’ natural resources.145
Under this version of the doctrine, the trust arose out of necessity
because Indian tribes and people were weak and defenseless.
Indians as individuals became “wards” of the government because
they were considered incompetent to manage their own personal
affairs.146 The legal reasoning in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock is
typical of many cases during this period.147 At issue in the case was
an effort by the Cherokee Nation to prevent the Secretary of the
Interior from leasing Cherokee lands for mineral exploitation
without the Cherokees’ consent. Relying on two previous cases,148
the Court found that the Indian tribes were “in a condition of
pupilage or dependency, and subject to the paramount authority of
the United States.”149 The Court further held that the
administration of tribal property was within the exclusive authority
of Congress: “the power being political and administrative in its
nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province
of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the
See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
See Judith Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political
Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2008).
144.
145.

146. For a recent article explaining the racist roots of this second
version of the trust doctrine, see Nagle, Nothing to Trust, supra note 12.
147. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
148. Stephens, 174 U.S. 445; S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641.
149. 187 U.S. at 305.
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courts.”150 Perhaps this notion of the trust doctrine is closer to the
doctrine’s ancient roots than Chief Justice Marshall’s version.151 In
colonial times, the doctrine seemed to have been based on the
notion of European superiority and the perceived duty of the
colonizers to civilize and Christianize what were considered inferior
people. According to one scholar, the main purpose of the trust
doctrine in colonial times was to assimilate and take control of the
property of the colonized.152 Some scholars have also argued that
the historic trust doctrine is full of racist baggage that cannot be
unloaded.153
The major problem with relying on Mancari’s “rationally
tied to the trust” test to fend off laws discriminating against Indians
is that there is no judicially defined meaning for what constitutes
Congress’s unique obligations towards Indians. While the Court has
developed standards for breach of trust by the Executive Branch
and has allowed tribes to bring lawsuits against the United States
for money damages in the court of claims pursuant to the Tucker
Act,154 these standards have never been applied to cases challenging
the constitutionality of congressional legislation. Today, even
scholars such as Professor Mary Wood, who have taken a
conciliatory position towards the trust doctrine and advocate the
continued use of a vigorous trust doctrine as a means to protect the
reservations’ environment from deleterious federal policies and
actions by federal officials, concede that the trust doctrine as a limit
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 308.
See discussion, supra, at notes 48-51.
See, e.g., Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The Imperial Origins of

Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Colonization in Britain, Ireland, and
America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1207 (1999).
153. For a version of this argument see ROBERT WILLIAMS, LIKE A
LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
154. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505 (2011); see United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206 (1983), United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S.
465 (2003); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); see also
Judith N. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust

Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral
Resources, 71 N. D. L. Rev. 327, 329-34 (1995).
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on the legislative branch may be a retreating mirage.155 Only one
Supreme Court case has addressed a somewhat similar issue. In
United States v. Sioux Nation,156 the Court held that because the
taking of the Black Hills from the Sioux by the Federal government
was not related to the trust obligations of the United States, the
Sioux were owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
According to the Sioux Nation Court, “[t]he question whether a
particular measure was appropriate for protecting and advancing
the tribe’s interests, and therefore not subject to the constitutional
command of the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in nature.
The answer must be based on a consideration of all the evidence
presented.”157 While the Sioux Nation principle may at first seem
innocuous, scholars have criticized it.158 The problem here is that it
is not the tribes themselves who make the decision that a law was
enacted truly for their benefit; it is the courts. These courts may
give great deference to what Congress thought it was doing when it
enacted such legislation. In one aspect, Sioux Nation and Mancari
follow a similar reasoning: In Mancari, the Court allowed Congress
to disregard the racial aspect of laws treating Indians differently,
but only if that legislation was tied to the trust responsibility, while
in Sioux Nation, the Court would have allowed Congress to
disregard the Just Compensation Clause, but only if it had acted
pursuant to the trust doctrine.
In retrospect, Sioux Nation was an easy case since it dealt
with what was probably the most egregious abrogation of an Indian
treaty by the United States. Other cases may be more difficult to
resolve because the trust power can be both too broad, and too
narrow a qualification of congressional power. The over-breadth
Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49.
448 U.S. 371 (1980).
Id. at 415.
See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth
Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule,
61 OR. L. REV. 245 (1982); Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take
Property by Calling it a “Mere Change in the Form of Investment”, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 37, at 38 (2002); see also Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian
Affairs after Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235 (1982).
155.
156.
157.
158.
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can be seen by asking whether a law prohibiting the sale of liquor to
only tribal Indians would be upheld under the trust doctrine.
Pointing out to studies demonstrating a higher rate of alcoholism
among tribal members, it is not unimaginable to think that some
judges may find the law rationally related to the protection of
Indians under the trust doctrine. On the other hand, the trust
doctrine could be used to impose overly narrow restrictions on
Congress. Nothing in the words of the Indian Commerce Clause
mandates that Congress only enact legislation benefitting Indians
pursuant to the trust. Congress can act at times as a trustee and at
others as a regulator.159 So, unless one adopts an exceedingly broad
definition of the trust responsibility, many acts of Congress, which
are not enacted for the benefit of Indians but for the purpose of
regulating them, would ostensibly fail the Mancari test.
The second problem with reliance on the trust doctrine is
that while the doctrine has been used to constrain the power of the
Executive Branch,160 it has been used in the past mostly to expand
the power of the Legislative Branch.161 As Dean Nell Newton once
stated, the trust doctrine is “not constitutionally based and thus not
enforceable against Congress.”162 The likelihood that the Court will
start using the trust doctrine to control the power of Congress is, to
say the least, remote. So far, it seems that only one court seriously
undertook the review of legislation to see if it was enacted in
violation of the Indian Trust Doctrine and, not surprisingly, found
that it was not.163
159. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative
Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 253, 265-69 (2010).
160. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal
Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109 (1995).
161. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (holding that because of the trust
doctrine Congress had the power to enact the Major Crimes Act even though
it exceeded its power under the Indian Commerce Clause).
162. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 232-33 (1984).
163. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F.
Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988 was enacted in conformance with the Trust even though the Tribe argued
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Some scholars favoring continued use of the trust doctrine,
such as Reid Chambers, take the position that the major problem
with the trust doctrine is that it has been misunderstood. Properly
conceived, the trust doctrine should be viewed primarily as a
doctrine to protect and encourage tribal self-government.164
Unfortunately, a recent Supreme Court case, United States v.
Jicarilla Apache Nation,165 seems to indicate that at least the
majority of the Supreme Court is stuck on the Kagama version of
the doctrine. In Jicarilla Apache, the Tribe brought a breach of
trust case against the United States, claiming mismanagement of
tribal funds held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the
Tribe. In order to make their case, the tribal attorneys wanted
access to certain documents that the United States claimed were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Tribe argued that
the privilege was not available because of the “fiduciary exception.”
Under that exception, the attorney-client privilege does not prevent
the beneficiary of a trust from having access to communications
between the trustee and its lawyers concerning management of the
trust funds.
The Supreme Court held that the common law “fiduciary”
exception was not available to Indian tribes trying to get documents
from the United States. The Court determined that the fiduciary
exception is a common law exception applicable to private trustees.
However, the United States was not analogous to a private trustee
because, while the duties of a private trustee are defined by the
common law, the duties of the United States as trustee for the
tribes are uniquely defined by federal statutes.166 In addition, the
trust function the United States performed was a sovereign function
subject to the plenary power of Congress, and Congress has

that it infringed on its sovereignty and right of self-government).
164. Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust

Responsibility with Self Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on
Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century,
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Paper No. 13A (2005).
165. 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
166. Id. at 2323.
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structured that function to pursue its own policy goals.167 In other
words, according to the Court, Congress looks mostly at its own
sovereign interests and not the tribes when enacting statutes
pursuant to the trust relationship.
Justice Alito’s Opinion for the Court is at odds with several
previous notions about the trust doctrine. The most important is the
role of the common law of trust in defining the United States trust
obligations towards the tribes.168 According to Justice Alito, the
United States trust obligations are solely derived from statutes and
not federal common law. The previous common scholarly
understanding maintained that the trust responsibility the United
States has towards Indian nations flowed primarily from three
sources. First, the hundreds of treaties signed between the tribes
and the United States.169 Second, the huge amount of lands the
United States acquired from the tribes in those treaties or
otherwise.170 Third, that the Doctrine of Discovery, under which the
territory of the Indian tribes was incorporated into the geographical
limits of the United States, transformed tribal ownership of these
lands into a right of occupancy to live on lands over which the
United States had ultimate dominion.171 Although the Court still
stated that it did “not question the undisputed existence of a
general trust relationship,”172 that relationship seems to now be
167. Id. at 2324.
168. See United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S. Ct.
1126, 1133 (2003). Finding that the existence of trust duties on behalf of the
United States was confirmed because “This is so because elementary trust law,
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually
administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch.
One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee is to preserve and
maintain trust assets.” Id. at 1133 (internal citations omitted).
169. See Nagle, Nothing to Trust, supra note 12, at 67-68.
170. See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49.
171. See Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered, supra
note 50, at 166 (stating, “[t]he trust doctrine plainly had its genesis in the
Discovery doctrine . . . This thinking came largely from the Eurocentric ideas
of Discovery and the notion that uncivilized, infidel savages needed to be
saved by Euro-Americans.” Id.).
172. Id.
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next to meaningless since the tribes can no longer invoke common
law trust standards unless Congress specifically calls for them. The
decision raises, therefore, some profound questions concerning the
utility of the doctrine from a tribal perspective.
One could search for a silver lining in the decision by
arguing that if the general trust relationship can no longer be used
by the tribes to impose additional duties on the United States, the
existence of a general trust should no longer be used by the Court
to boost Congressional power over Indian tribes beyond the power
to regulate Commerce with the tribes. However, the general tone of
the Jicarilla Apache opinion seems to indicate that the majority of
the Court believes that the main purpose of the trust doctrine still is
to give Congress plenary authority over Indian tribes. The Jicarilla
Apache Opinion reads as if it were written during the heart of the
Allotment era, between the Court’s decisions in Kagama and
Lonewolf.
It is for this reason that this article takes the position that
Indians should not view the trust doctrine as a source to control or
regulate congressional power, even if it is for the purpose of
supporting the legitimacy of laws favoring Indians, unless the trust
duties can be tied to promises made in treaties. In other words, the
only extra-constitutional sources of congressional power over
Indian Affairs are the numerous treaties signed with the Indian
tribes. The only general duty imposed on the United States in those
treaties is to guarantee the survival of Indian tribes as selfgoverning entities with sovereignty over their lands and
territories.173 Therefore, the sole role of the trust doctrine in
boosting congressional power beyond its Indian Commerce Clause
power should be to legitimize any legislation enacted to protect the
tribes’ right to tribal territories and self-government. Otherwise,
congressional power should be limited to the text of the Indian
Commerce Clause as previously explained.174
While I would have nothing against using the Mancari
173. See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 49, at
1496-97. This does not mean that the United States does not have specific trust
duties resting on specific treaty clauses, or statutes.
174. See supra notes 135-43.
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“related to the trust” standard if there were a consensus that laws
enacted pursuant to the trust have to support tribal selfgovernment, the recent Supreme Court decision in Jicarilla reveals
a different understanding of the trust doctrine. So, for instance,
many of these secretarial approval requirements relating to the
management and lease of Indian land would pass muster under the
Jicarilla version of the trust doctrine.
In conclusion, challenging statutes based on the fact that
they treat Indians differently and are not rationally tied to the trust
is an uphill battle with limited possibilities. In the next Part,
however, I discuss whether restrictions on the tribes’ right to
manage their own lands may amount to a denial of equal
protection.
III. FROM MANCARI TO WINDSOR: USING A RATIONAL
BASIS WITH BITE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS TO
CHALLENGE FEDERAL INDIAN LAWS ON EQUAL
PROTECTION GROUNDS
In this Part, I argue that federal statutes which restrict tribal
self-government, such as those mandating secretarial approval of
tribal land management decisions, can be successfully challenged on
equal protection grounds using either an “unconstitutional animus”
test,175 or a version of the rational basis test at times called “rational
basis with bite.” 176
As the Court put it, “[u]nder traditional equal protection
analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the
classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.”177 However, under the established tiered approach to
equal protection, laws involving a suspect class such as race or
See Pollvogt, supra note 35.
See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Supreme Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); see also Gayle
L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62, IND. L. J. 779 (1987).
177. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533.
175.
176.
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alienage are reviewed under strict scrutiny where the law has to be
necessary or narrowly tailored to protect a compelling
governmental interest.178 Finally, laws involving a quasi-suspect
class, such as gender or illegitimacy, are analyzed under
intermediate scrutiny, which requires the classification to be
substantially related to an important governmental interest.179 The
criteria for a suspect or quasi-suspect classification developed by
the Supreme Court are (1) an immutable characteristic, such as race
or gender, which is (2) irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
goal, and which has (3) been historically used to the disadvantage of
a group that is (4) relatively politically powerless to defend itself.
While Native Americans easily qualify as a suspect class
under these criteria, classifications referring only to members of
Indian tribes and not to Native Americans generally may not fit the
first criterion, as it is generally understood that Indians can
relinquish their tribal membership. While tribal members generally
fit the third criterion, they may not fit the second, since
membership in a tribe may be relevant to a legitimate governmental
goal. As many have noted, however, even when dealing with a nonsuspect class, the Supreme Court at times seems to be using a more
aggressive form of scrutiny than the regular rational basis review,
even though it has never acknowledged that fact.180 Specifically,
scholars claim that in a group of cases, the most important of which
are Moreno,181 Cleburne,182 Romer v. Evans,183 and Windsor,184 the
178. Although that standard was first used in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), its source is the famous footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), which stated “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily relied
upon to protect minorities,” and therefore “may call for correspondingly more
searching inquiry.” Id.
179. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where, for the first
time, a majority of the Justices held that intermediate scrutiny was the proper
level of review for classifications based on gender).
180. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of RationalBasis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281 (2011).
181. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528.
182. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
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Court has claimed to use rational basis review while in effect
performing a more searching inquiry.

A. The Case Law Showing Either a “Rational Basis with Bite”
Standard of Review and/or “Unconstitutional Animus”
In Moreno, a class action was brought challenging a
provision of the Food Stamp Act providing that any household
containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the
household was no longer eligible for food stamps. The Court,
purporting to use regular rational basis review, held that the
classification (distinguishing between certain kinds of households
when it came to eligibility) was not rationally related to the stated
purpose of the legislation, which was to minimize fraud and
maintain adequate nutrition while stimulating the agricultural
economy. After scrutinizing the legislative history and finding that
the different treatment was driven by the desire to prevent
“hippies” and “hippie communes” from participating in the food
stamp program, the Court famously declared “if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must
at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”185 Answering the government’s argument
that the provision was nevertheless rationally related to prohibiting
fraud, the Court found that other sections of the Act specifically
addressed the fraud issue and did it more effectively.186
In Cleburne, a group home for mentally disabled people
challenged a zoning ordinance excluding such group homes from
certain zoning districts. The Court held that even though the
mentally disabled did not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
the zoning ordinance denied the group home the equal protection
of the laws in that the exclusion from some districts was not
rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. After
183.
184.
185.
186.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
133 S. Ct. 2675.
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
Id. at 536.
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stating that the State “may not rely on a classification whose
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational,”187 the Court concluded that “the
record [did] not reveal any rational basis for believing that the
[group] home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate
interests.”188 The Court examined closely the reasons given by the
City for the exclusion of such group homes and stated “mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible
basis for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from
apartment houses.”189 The Court concluded “the short of it is that
requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”190
In Romer v. Evans, Colorado voters adopted, via statewide
referendum, an amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting
any governmental actions designed to protect the status of persons
based on their “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships.”191 Rejecting the State’s
principal argument that the amendment simply placed gays and
lesbians in the same position as others, the Court held that the
amendment went far beyond depriving homosexuals of special
rights but imposed upon them, and them alone, the burden of
seeking specific legal protection for injuries caused by
discrimination.192 The Court first remarked that “[e]ven in the
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of
standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained.”193 The Court
also observed that the amendment “identifies persons by a single
trait and then denies them protection across the board,”194 by
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 450.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 633.
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denying them the right to seek specific legislative protections.
According to the Court, that type of denial was unprecedented, and
therefore “discrimination of an unusual character especially
suggests careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”195 Finally, after stating
that the “laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
towards the class of persons affected,” the Court concluded that the
amendment “classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to anyone else. This
Colorado cannot do.”196
Finally, in Windsor, relying mostly on Romer, Moreno, and
Lawrence v. Texas,197 the Court struck down the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) on equal protection grounds. After
finding that the right to marry was an important right and that the
State decision to recognize and validate marriages between samesex couples “conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense
import,”198 the Court stated that “[t]he avowed purpose and
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages.”199 Having analyzed the legislative history
of DOMA, the Court found that interference with the equal dignity
of same-sex marriages was the very “essence” and purpose of
DOMA.200 Therefore, DOMA violated “basic due process and
equal protection principles,”201 because “a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify
disparate treatment of that group.”202
195. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S.
322, 337-38 (1928)).
196. Id. at 634-35.
197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
198. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
199. Id. at 2693.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. Although Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, spent a
considerable part of the opinion on the fact that regulations of domestic
relation is a traditional functions of the state governments, it is hard to
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“The decision,” as one scholar put it, “is peripatetic. It
heads down a path toward federalism, but suddenly veers off in the
direction of ‘liberty,’ looking back over its shoulder towards states’
authority. Then it pivots toward equal protection, with darts toward
dignity, before finally settling on animus as a destination. When we
arrive . . . we may ask ourselves, ‘Well, how did [we] get here?’”203
No wonder some see the decision as an equal protection case
involving a heightened version of rational basis review,204 while
others see it as a liberty and fundamental right case,205 and still
others as being based on the anti-animus doctrine.206

B. The Four Cases as Representing Unconstitutional Animus
Some scholars have identified these four cases and others
like them as establishing the principle that anytime the
classification is driven by “unconstitutional animus,” the law is
automatically a denial of equal protection.207 In other words, once
“unconstitutional animus” is identified there is no reason to
perform either rational basis or rational basis with bite review. The
two major questions relating to animus is first defining what it is,
and secondly determining what evidence can be used and is needed
to establish the presence of animus.
In an insightful article written before Windsor, after first
establishing that many rational basis with bite cases are better
explained as “animus” cases, Professor Pollvogt defined animus as
“a type of impermissible objective function. Specifically, animus is
determine how important a role federalism concerns played in the decision
since the Court also stated “[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts
the federal balance.” Id. at 2692.
203. Carpenter, supra, note 35 at 192-93.
204. See Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court can Strike Down Marriage
Restrictions Under Traditional Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 331 (2013).
205. See Douglas Nejaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE
L.J. 219 (2013).
206. See Carpenter, supra note 35, at 225.
207. See Pollvogt, supra note 35; Carpenter, supra note 35.
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present where the public laws are harnessed to create and enforce
distinctions between social groups—that is, groups of persons
identified by status rather than conduct.”208 In a post Windsor
article, Professor Dale Carpenter provided his own definition of
animus:
The government acts on animus when, to a material
degree, it aims “to disparage and to injure” a person
or group of people. The injury may be tangible, as in
the denial of benefits and protections a group would
have in the absence of animus against them. Or the
injury may be intangible, as in the affront to their
dignity and the respect they deserve as equal
citizens.209
After stating that, “[i]n animus cases, the impermissible
purpose is the purpose to inflict injury or indignity,”210 Professor
Carpenter argued that such purpose does not have to be the sole or
even the dominant purpose, but need only be a “‘motivating factor
in the decision’ to support the conclusion that the act is
unconstitutional.”211 After stating that such a “motivating factor can
be inferred from such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available,” Professor Carpenter set out the evidence
needed to establish animus. For indirect or circumstantial evidence
needed to raise such an inference, Professor Carpenter listed
factors such as the impact of the decision, the historical
background, the specific sequences of events leading to the
decision, and whether there was departure from normal procedures
in making the decision or departure from substantial considerations
that would normally drive the result.212 As for direct evidence,
208. Pollvogt, supra note 35, at 926.
209. Carpenter, supra note 35, at 186 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2696) (emphasis in original).
210. Id. at 243.
211. Id. at 244 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
212. Id. at 245.
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Professor Carpenter enumerates five factors as establishing direct
evidence that animus was a “material influence” in the passage of
the statute: (1) statutory text, (2) political and legal context, (3)
legislative proceedings, (4) real world impact or effect, and (5) the
utter failure of alternative explanations for the legislation.
Importantly, Carpenter notes that “[t]he Court’s animus cases show
that no single one of these factors must be present in order to make
the inference” of improper animus.213
Professor Pollvogt agrees that unconstitutional animus can
be established by direct evidence of bias in the legislative record
but also argues that an “inference of animus” can be “based on the
structure of the law.”214 Discussing Cleburne as a prime example of
animus based on the structure of the law, Pollvogt posits that the
Court performed a “micro” suspect classification analysis not for
the purpose of establishing a suspect or quasi-suspect class but
rather to examine “the validity of the classification in light of the
interests at stake in that particular case.”215
Evaluating which Federal Indian law statutes were enacted
with animus as a motivating factor is beyond the scope of this
article. Further, not all the statutes mandating federal approval
concerning land management decisions were enacted with animus
towards Indians. However, many such statues were doubtlessly
enacted out of prejudice and bias towards Native Americans.
Claims that Indian tribes and their members were in need of
federal supervision because they were not sophisticated enough to
manage their own affairs, or were incompetent and inferior, should
no longer be considered valid legislative purposes. A search of the
legislative history should produce evidence on which laws were
enacted with these stereotypes in mind. As the Court stated in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, “[c]are must be taken
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypical notions. Thus if the statutory objective is to
exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are

213.
214.
215.

Id. at 245-46.
Pollvogt, supra at note 35, at 926-27.
Id. at 927.
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presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately
inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”216 Although Hogan
dealt with gender classifications, a quasi-suspect class, the same
reasoning should follow in evaluating whether laws imposing
restrictions on Indian tribes and their members were enacted with
these biases in mind.

C. The Four Cases as Creating a Rational Basis with Bite Standard
As stated previously, the four cases can be interpreted as
creating a higher level of rational basis review. There are two major
questions concerning implementation of the review with bite
standard. First, how different is this form of judicial review from the
regular rational basis review? Secondly, what groups should be
covered by this more intensive form of judicial review? In other
words, what are the characteristics a group has to possess in order
to qualify for this form of judicial review?

1. How is Rational Basis with Bite Different than Regular
Rational Basis Review?
Regular rational basis review requires courts to perform
essentially three tasks. First, the reviewing court has to determine
that the group being classified or discriminated against is similarly
situated with others not included in the classification. Second, it has
to determine that the governmental purpose is legitimate. Finally
the court has to determine that the classification is rationally
related to accomplishing the purpose. The first basic difference
between regular rational basis review and review with bite is in
determining the purpose. In regular review, courts will come up
with almost any purpose they can think of that will suit or fit the
classification. Courts do not try to determine what purposes the
legislature actually had in mind when it enacted the statute. In
review with bite, the exact opposite happens. Courts will sift
through the legislative record to find the true motives of the
legislature. This was very evident in Moreno and Windsor where
216.

458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
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the Court found animus towards hippies and homosexuals,
respectively.217 It was harder to determine in Romer since the law
was the product of a referendum and therefore lacked a legislative
record.218 However, the unusualness of the law in that case raised
an inference that the purpose was indeed inappropriate.
A second basic difference between the two levels of review
is in questioning the legitimacy of purported governmental
interests. While the Court has not devised a test for determining
what constitutes an improper purpose, the four cases analyzed
above reveal that treating a group differently because of irrational
fear or prejudice, as well as a mere desire to harm politically
unpopular groups or vulnerable minorities, can never justify
legislation putting such groups at a disadvantage to everyone else.
Finally, a third difference is that once the real purpose has
been established, courts using the review with bite approach will
look at all the evidence available in the record to determine if the
mean chosen (treating the group differently) is in fact rationally
related to achieving the purpose of the legislation. In other words,
the approach not only puts the burden on the state to produce
evidence justifying the classification, but also looks more closely at
whether the mean chosen is adequately tailored to achieving the
purpose. In regular rational basis review, courts usually assume that
there is a correlation between the classification and the purpose, or
at least that the legislature could have rationally believed that such
correlation existed. This assumption is not made in review with bite
analysis.

2. Should Tribal Members and Indian Tribes Be Included Among
Groups Qualifying for Rational Basis With Bite Review?
Since the Court has never acknowledged the use of rational
basis with bite, it has of course not described how to determine
what groups or situations would trigger such approach. After
looking for similarities among the groups who have benefitted from
such review, one scholar wondered if heightened review could be
217.
218.

See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
517 U.S. at 634-35.
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triggered every time the Court dealt with the denial of significant
governmental benefits. Discounting such possibility and finding no
common bonds among the groups, that scholar concluded that,
“[t]here does not seem to be any consistent principle that explains
why the U.S. Supreme Court chooses one version of rationality in
one case but not in another with a very similar factual setting.”219
Others have also attempted to find a common strain among the
cases. Finding that, “Lawrence mandates heightened protection for
autonomy interests central to personhood while Moreno and its
progeny requires judicial sensitivity to regulations that burden
vulnerable minorities.” One commentator concluded that “[w]hen a
statute impinges crucial personal autonomy interests or targets a
group on the basis of mere animus,”220 rational basis with bite
applies. In this article, I suggest that the case law reflects that
rational basis with bite is appropriate every time a disfavored group
lacking political clout makes an equal protection claim involving
the denial of important, albeit not fundamental, liberty interests. 221
In other words, rational basis with bite is applicable anytime the
legislation is aimed at a vulnerable or unpopular minority and
restricts an important liberty interest.
An example of a case with similar arguments as the four
analyzed above is Plyler v. Doe,222 where the Court reviewed a
Texas law preventing undocumented children from getting the free
education available to other children under what seemed a
219. Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational Basis Review
and Same-Sex Relationship, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 305-06 (2011); see also
Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373-82
(1999) (discounting the viability of rational basis with bite as a standalone
form of judicial review).
220. Austin Raynor, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order
Rational Basis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1075 (2013).
221. See, e.g., David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of
Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 51
(2013) (arguing that restrictions on the freedom to contract when imposed
discriminatorily based on status, rather than capacity, should be subject to
additional scrutiny).
222. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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somewhat heightened form of review. While undocumented status
was not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the right to a free
education was not considered a fundamental right, the Court struck
down the law even though the classification seemed to have been
rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of
preserving scarce financial resources.223 In other words, one
possible explanation for the result is that it is the combination of
denying an important benefit (education) to a vulnerable minority
(undocumented children) that generated a higher level of scrutiny.
Examples of a combination of rights raising the level of judicial
review can be found in other areas of constitutional law. According
to Justice Scalia, this combination of rights explained the Court’s
invalidation of laws of general applicability under the Free Exercise
Clause.224 In Employment Division v. Smith, holding that the Free
Exercise Clause alone was not available as a defense against a
criminal law of general applicability, he stated, “[t]he only decisions
in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application
of neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”225
Drawing an analogy with laws discriminating against tribes by
restricting their right to solely manage their land and natural
resources, one could argue that Indian tribes, like undocumented
children, are a vulnerable minority and that the right to contract,
while no longer a fundamental right,226 is still an important right as
reflected by the inclusion of the Contract Clause in the United
States Constitution.227
In conclusion, for the following reasons, this article takes
the position that rational basis with bite should apply to federal
223. See Id. at 249-51 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
224. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990).
225. Id.
226. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
227. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 reads in part: “No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts.”
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laws and regulations burdening the tribes’ management of their
land and natural resources. First, even though as described
previously the classification is not a racial one, there is no doubt
that the classification, tribes and their members, involves a
vulnerable group lacking political power. Secondly, while managing
one’s own land does not involve the same kind of autonomy
interest that was at stake in Lawrence, an argument can be made
that important economic liberties are involved when making crucial
managerial decisions concerning one’s own lands.228 As stated by
one scholar, “[t]he argument that these restrictions exist for the
benefit of the American Indians is not dissimilar from earlier
arguments regarding the faculties of blacks, slaves, or women. As
with gender, race, and servitude, the law has partially restricted a
fundamental right to contract based on an involuntary characteristic
of a group who has suffered substantial discrimination.”229

D. Making the Case for Denial of Equal Protection
Once the rational basis with bite test is found applicable, the
case still has to be made that these land management regulations
amount to a denial of equal protection. Two obstacles have to be
overcome: First, the Indians have to show that they are similarly
situated with other individuals or groups not subject to the
restriction. Secondly, they have to demonstrate that the actual
purpose of the law is inappropriate or that the substance of the
regulation is not rationally tied to that purpose.

1. Overcoming the “Not Similarly Situated” Argument
As the Court stated in Cleburne, the Equal Protection
Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.”230 The “similarly situated” concept is not

228. A similar argument concerning all restrictions on economic
freedoms was made in Raynor, Economic Liberty, supra note 220.
229. Weber, supra note 221, at 80.
230. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
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new; it has been around since 1885.231 It was used successfully to
deny equal protection to women before the advent of intermediate
scrutiny and the classification of gender as a quasi- suspect class.232
Currently, it is used by anti-marriage equality advocates to argue
that homosexual couples are not similarly situated to heterosexual
couples.233 Perhaps the more important debate surrounding the
“similarly situated” doctrine concerns whether this determination
should be a threshold inquiry or be included as part of an
integrated approach.234 As argued by one scholar advocating the
integrated approach,
In cases regarding express categories, no matter the
level of equal protection applied, the focus of the
“similarly situated” analysis is substantially the same
as the key inquiry of equal protection review. Does
the legislative classification bear a close enough
relationship to the purpose of the statute . . . the
analysis, properly understood, is another way of
describing the substantive equal protection
inquiry.235
Courts have questioned the ‘similarly situated’ doctrine
arguing that if part of the threshold inquiry required plaintiffs to
bear the burden of finding others with the same classifying trait as
them, but not part of the class being discriminated against, that
burden would never be met.236 The same-sex marriage cases
provide a good example of how circular the similarly situated
requirement can become. If the law discriminates against all samesex couples and the argument is that heterosexual couples are not
similarly situated to heterosexual ones, the same-sex advocates
231. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
232. See Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 581, 607-08 (2011).
233. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
234. See Shay, supra note 231.
235. Id. at 588.
236. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
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have lost the battle before it has started. This is why most courts
have stated that the central inquiry is not whether all these couples
are similarly situated to each other, but whether they are similarly
situated when it comes to the purpose of the law.237
When it comes to challenging federal statutes imposing
restrictions on tribally owned land, how one describes the purpose
of the statute could be crucial in establishing the similarly situated
requirement. This is why applying rational basis with bite is very
important to such cases. That is because under such more intense
review, courts will look for the real purpose behind the
classification. For instance, if the purpose of the legislation is to
protect “all tribes with land held in trust,” or “protecting the tribal
land base,” as the Federal government will no doubt argue, one
could probably successfully assert that there is no one else similarly
situated since no one else owns land in trust. That would be an
example of a circular argument similar to the argument being made
by the anti-marriage equality advocates. On the other hand, if one
can argue that the purpose of the statute is protecting certain
people or entities owning land from predators or poor decisionmaking, the universe of similarly situated people expands
dramatically.
One argument sure to be made by federal officials is that
Indian tribes are not similarly situated to anyone else because the
United States has a general trust relationship with the Indian tribes.
In addition, the United States holds over 56 million acres of Indian
land in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes and their members.238 In
other words, it is the United States that has the trust or legal title to
the land while the Indians only have the beneficial title to such
lands. As explained later, the existence of a “general” trust
relationship should be irrelevant unless the trustee can be held
financially liable for breaching its duties under that relationship.239
Id. at 435 n.54.
See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Performance and Accountability
Report: Fiscal Year 2005, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
available
at,
http://www.bia.gov.cs/groups/public/
documents/text/idc237.
238.

001922.pdf (last visited May 7, 2015).
239. See infra notes 248-80.
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Concerning the fact that the United States has trust title to tribal
land, it is true that language in many cases indicates that since the
United States owns the legal or trust title to all Indian lands, it
naturally has plenary power to manage such lands.240 While it is
generally accepted that over 56 million acres of Indian land is
owned in trust by the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes
and individual tribal members, scholars have recently begun to
challenge this general assumption.241 According to these scholars,
there are only two legitimate sources giving trust title for the
United States.242 They are first, the statutes specifying that land was
being taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of
Indians. Statutes such as the General Allotment Act,243 the Indian
Reorganization Act,244 and other tribal specific legislation, contain
such authorizations. Secondly, some of the treaties signed with
specific tribes may contain such trust language. The overwhelming
majority of treaties, however, do not provide for treaty lands to be
held in trust.245 The Indian Land Tenure Foundation has estimated
that 15.7 million acres of allotted land remained in trust as of 1934,
and that another 6.7 million acres have been taken into trust under
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act since 1934.246 This is
about 34 million acres short of the 56 million claimed to be held in
trust by the United States. Most of these 34 million acres are tribal
treaty land and became seen as being held into trust just because at
some undesignated point during the 20th Century, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs by administrative fiat began to treat these lands as if
240. See Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
241. See INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, NATIVE LAND LAW,
supra note 14.
242. Id. at 66-70.
243. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887) (repealed in 1934).
244. Pub. L. 73-383, 49 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479).
245. Coulter, supra note 248, at 81-82 (“The evidence seems to
suggest that the United States generally did no gain trust title to Indian lands
through treaty. Rather in a limited set of treaties, the United States gained
trust title over the proceeds of lands sold for the Indian nation or to lands held
by individual Indians.” Id.)
246. Id. at 75.
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they were held in trust. I agree with scholars such as Robert Coulter
who have argued that the United States should not be considered as
holding trust title to these lands.247
Robert Coulter argued that the only possible non statutory
or non-treaty sources for such legal title are the Doctrine of
Discovery, the general trust relationship, and the notion that
because Indians are incompetent, they should be considered the
wards of the federal government;248 in other words, doctrines of
federal common law. Coulter dismissed them all as illegitimate
sources of trust title.249 Needless to say, federal common law should
no longer be based on racist notions treating Indians as
incompetent wards in order to justify trust title in the United States
as was done in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.250 Furthermore, the
existence of a general trust relationship is not a valid legal reason to
vest trust “title” in the United States. Although this does not mean
that the United States does not have a general duty to protect these
lands from being taken from the tribes, implying from this limited
duty a general plenary authority to manage and control such lands
is wrong. This leaves the Doctrine of Discovery as the only possible
reason for holding land into trust. Under the doctrine, the
discovering colonial power was considered to have the exclusive
right to acquire lands in the discovered country from the aboriginal
people living there.251 This exclusivity has also been called a right of
preemption.252 However, in Johnson v. M’Intosh,253 Justice Marshall
modified or Americanized the doctrine when he held that under the
doctrine, once discovered by a European power, the Indian tribes’
right or title to their territory was transformed into a “right of
occupancy” and, “their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 76-83.
Id.
Id.
187 U.S. 294 (1902); see supra notes 145-49.
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823).
See Miller, supra note 50.
21 U.S. 543.
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who made it.”254
The European nations were not in agreement concerning
the exact ramifications of the Doctrine of Discovery when it came
to its effect on the rights of the Indians.255 As argued by Professor
Robert Williams, the European nations only agreed that the
Doctrine of Discovery vested in the discoverer “an exclusive or
‘preemptive’ entitlement to deal with the natives as against other
Europeans crowns.”256 It seems that no other nation took the
position that the discovering nation immediately acquired full title
to Indian land.257 In a recent article, Professor Michael Blumm has
argued that Johnson v. M’Intosh really stands for the proposition
that the Indians had fee title to their land subject to a restriction
against alienation and that “[c]onsequently, Marshall’s references
to ‘exclusive title’ and ‘absolute title’ must have meant sovereignty .
. . [s]imilarly, references to ‘ultimate title’ and ‘seisin’ in his opinion
had to do with sovereign authority, not proprietorship.”258
Whatever the true intent of Justice Marshall in Johnson v.
M’Intosh, federal common law can and has evolved. To still hang
on to the colonial Doctrine of Discovery with all its racist baggage
and argue that the federal government today has ultimate,
exclusive, or absolute title to Indian land is profoundly wrong, at
least from a moral standpoint. For instance, some 125 years after
Johnson v. M’Intosh Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding of the
doctrine was relied upon by the Court to hold that the Indian Right
Id. at 574.
See Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights:
A Historical Rejoinder to the claim of “Universal Recognition” of the
Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 498-40 (discussing
254.
255.

Spanish, French, Dutch, Swedish and English versions).
256. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance
Origins and Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1, 70, n.300 (1983).
257. See Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights:

A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” to the
Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 498-540 (Discussing
Spanish, French, Dutch, Swedish, and English versions of the Doctrine).
258. See Michael C. Blumm, Why Aboriginal Title is a Fee Simple
Title Absolute, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 975, 984 (2011).
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of Occupancy amounted to a non-vested property right and
therefore, aboriginal Indian lands held under such title could be
taken by the United States without having to give the Indians fair
compensation as mandated under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.259 By today’s standards, there is something not quite
right with this result.260

2. Arguing the Real (or Improper) Governmental Purpose
Rational basis with bite allows courts to investigate the real
purpose behind a law. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper
to investigate the real motivations that have guided Congress
throughout history to impose federal restrictions on tribal land
management decisions, one thing is for sure: the real purpose is not
always the claimed purpose. Claims that Congress always acts out
of compassion towards the Indians or is, as a good trustee, always
looking out for the best interest of the tribes are unfounded, at least
most of the time. In this respect, United States v. Sioux Nation is
relevant.261 This case upheld the Sioux Nation’s claim that when the
United States unilaterally abrogated many of the treaties made with
the Sioux and took the Black Hills,262 Congress had not been acting
as a trustee, but more as a conqueror pursuant to its power of
eminent domain. Therefore, the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was applicable and the federal government was
liable to the Sioux Nation for the taking of this vested property
right.263 In the process of deciding the case, the Court quoted with
approval the following from an older case:

259.
260.

See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
See generally ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICAN

DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS AND CLARK,
AND MANIFEST DESTINY 173-78 (2006).
261. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
262. See supra notes 166-68.
263. The Just Compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment states
“[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 7.
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It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously
(1) act as trustee for the benefit of the Indians,
exercising its plenary power over the Indians and
their property, as it thinks is in their best interests,
and (2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent
domain, taking the Indians property . . . In any given
situation in which Congress has acted with regard to
Indian people, it must have acted in one capacity or
the other. Congress can own two hats, but it cannot
wear them both at the same time.264
In proceeding to determine which hat Congress was wearing
when it abrogated the Sioux Treaty and took the Black Hills, the
Sioux Nation Court held that courts no longer could presume that
Congress always acted for the benefit of the Indians pursuant to its
role as trustee. Therefore, the Court stated that it was now
requiring “courts, in considering whether a particular congressional
action was taken in pursuance to Congress’s power to manage and
control tribal lands for the Indians’ welfare, to engage in a
thoroughgoing and impartial examination of the historical
record.”265
In making this inquiry, another Supreme Court case, United
States v. Navajo Nation,266 is instructive. This case involved a claim
for breach of trust by the Navajo Nation against the United States.
Although involving a series of extensive and complicated facts, the
Navajo Nation’s case boiled down to a claim that the Secretary of
the Interior should not have approved a mining lease between the
Navajo Nation and the Peabody Coal Corporation.267 The Navajo
Nation claimed that the Secretary of the Interior concealed key
information, putting it at a major disadvantage in the ensuing lease
negotiations with Peabody Coal.268 The Navajo Nation sued the
264. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 408 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes
of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
265. Id. at 415-16.
266. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
267. Id. at 500.
268. Id. at 501 (summarizing the Court of Appeals’ finding that the
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United States for breach of fiduciary duties, arguing that a
reasonable trustee would not have approved the lease because it
was detrimental to the interests of the Navajo Nation.269 The
Supreme Court denied the claim holding that when Secretary
Hodel approved the lease pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 (“IMLA”),270 he was not in breach of any specific
statutory trust duty. Under previous decisions, in order to make a
credible claim for money damages under the Indian Tucker Act,271
the Navajo Nation had to find a source of substantive law that “can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damage sustained.”272 However, in this case,
besides the lease approval requirement, IMLA did not assign any
managerial duties to the Secretary over coal leasing.273 As the Court
put it, the Act did not even create a limited or bare trust
relationship as IMLA contained no trust language whatsoever
obligating the Secretary to act as a trustee for the benefit of the
tribe. Implicit in this holding is that the Secretary was not, in effect,
acting as a trustee for the tribe when he approved the lease.274 The
case is meaningful because it tells us that the lease approval statute,
imposing on the Navajo Nation and other Indian tribes, a
Secretarial approval requirement not mandated on any other owner
of mineral resources was not enacted solely, if at all, for the benefit
of the tribes.

Interior Secretary had suppressed and concealed information. See Navajo
Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
269. Id. at 506-07.
270. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1938).
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1949).
272. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) [hereinafter
Mitchell II].
273. 537 U.S. at 507.
274. In summarizing (and affirming) the holding of the Court of
Federal Claims, the Supreme Court stated that even though the Claims Court
had found that Secretary had acted in the best interest of Peabody rather than
the Tribe, it held that the Tribe had failed to make its case and the United
States was entitle to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 501 (citing Navajo
Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 236 (Fed. Cl. 2000)).
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In the scenario presented in Navajo Nation, there are two
arguments that could be made that the lease approval requirement
was a denial of equal protection. The first one is that since the
requirement of federal approval for all Navajo leases was not
enacted uniquely for the benefit of the Indians pursuant to the trust
relationship, under the Mancari standard, that discrimination or
different treatment cannot possibly be rationally tied to Congress’s
unique obligations towards the Indians. As such, the classification is
a violation of the Navajo Nation’s right to equal protection under
the laws. Claiming that Congress delegated that authority to the
Secretary pursuant to the general trust relationship is a
smokescreen that should be rejected. It is true that in United States
v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,275 the Court held that Congress could
not be compared to a regular common law trustee because, in
administering its trust responsibility towards Indians, it found that
“the Government had established the trust relationship in order to
impose its own policy on Indian lands . . . [i]n this way, Congress
has designed the trust relationship to serve the interests of the
United States as well as to benefit the Indian tribes.”276 While some
statutes could arguably benefit both the United States and the
tribes, when the interests of the United States, as represented in the
statute, are in conflict with tribal interests, one should not be able
to argue that the statute was enacted pursuant to the general trust
relationship in order to escape judicial scrutiny. This is especially
true since the Court in both Navajo Nation and Jicarilla Apache
took the position that trust duties are only created by specific
statutes and the United States can only be liable for a breach of
such specific statutory tasks.277
I have argued earlier, however, that Congress can impose
regulations under the Indian Commerce Clause that are not related
to the trust.278 The second argument for invalidating the statutory
requirement then becomes whether the non-trust purposes of the

275.
276.
277.
278.

131 S. Ct. 2313.
Id. at 2326-27.
See supra notes 165-72.
See supra note 159.
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statute is tied rationally to the restriction being imposed on the
Navajos.
In Navajo Nation, the Court found that IMLA did not
create any specific trust responsibilities.279 But if not pursuant to the
trust, in what capacity was Secretary Hodel acting? Why was he
given the power to approve the lease in the first place if not
pursuant to his powers as trustee? The Court did not dwell on this
question. In a long footnote it stated,
[b]eyond doubt, the IMLA was designed “to provide
Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue.”
But Congress had as a concrete objective in that
regard the removal of certain impediments that had
applied particularly to mineral leases on Indian land.
. . . That impediment-removing objective is discrete
from the Secretary’s lease approval role under the
IMLA.280
In other words, while parts of the statute may have been enacted
for the benefit of the Indians, the lease approval requirement may
have been there for a totally different reason. Therefore, it seems
that the Secretary in Navajo Nation was acting as a mere regulator,
implementing Congress’s power to regulate commerce between
Indian tribes and non-Indian entities such as Peabody Coal.

3. Arguing That the Classification Is Not Rationally Related to
the Purpose of the Law
Under rational basis review, with or without bite, the statute
can survive judicial review if the special classification, requiring
only Indian tribes to get secretarial approval in such instances, is
rationally tied to the actual purpose behind the legislation. In the
Navajo case referred to above, the question would be whether
imposing the approval requirement only in leases involving Navajo
279. 537 U.S. at 507, 511.
280. Id. at 511 n.16 (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 179)
(internal citation omitted).
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land is rationally tied to the real purpose behind the requirement.
While analyzing whether restrictions on tribal land management
decisions are rationally related to the real purposes of such statutes
is beyond the scope of this paper, one should bear in mind that
what may have been a legitimate governmental interest may
become illegitimate over the years. Furthermore, it may be that
while special treatment of Indians may have been at one time
rationally tied to the government’s effort to protect them, changed
circumstances may mean what was once considered appropriate
and rational is now no longer so. As the Court stated in Shelby
County, Alabama v. Holder,281 in considering the legitimacy of the
formula for determining which areas were covered by certain
sections of the Voting Rights Act:
When upholding the constitutionality of the
coverage formula in 1966, we concluded that it was
“rational in both practice and theory.” . . . By 2009,
however, we concluded that the “coverage formula
raise[d] serious constitutional questions.” As we
explained, a statute’s “current burdens” must be
justified by “current needs.” . . . The coverage
formula met that test in 1965, but no longer does
so.282
There are a number of precedents involving discrimination
against women before the Court in 1976 officially adopted
intermediate scrutiny for discrimination based on gender.283 For
instance, cases have upheld laws prohibiting women from practicing
law,284 from voting,285 from being employed in restaurants after 10

281. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
282. Id. at 2627 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330; Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203-04 (2009) (internal
citations omitted).
283. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
284. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
285. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
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PM,286 or from being bartenders.287 Although most of these cases
used rational basis review and upheld such discriminatory
treatment as not being a denial of equal protection, there is no
doubt that even under rational basis review, such classifications
would be held unconstitutional today.
Statutes such as 25 U.S.C. § 81, which imposes federal
approval requirements for tribal land management decisions, have
their origins in times when the overwhelming majority of Indians
were illiterate, uneducated, and did not speak English. An 1873
Congressional Report covering over 950 pages detailed both how
unscrupulous white men took advantage of the Indians and why
such Indians needed special protections and supervisions.288 The
sub-heading of the Report is indicative of the problems it was
addressing. It reads: “Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs
concerning frauds and wrongs committed against the Indians… By
this investigation and Report the Committee hopes to do something
to rid the Indians and the Indian Service of those heartless
scoundrels who infest it, and who do so much damage to the Indian,
the settler, and the Government.”289 The Report also makes it
obvious that its authors had a dim view of Indian intellectual
capabilities. For instance, the Report stated, “[t]he Indians seem to
be like potters’ clay in the hands of bad men, and are molded at
their will and pleasure in the management and disposition of their
property. When the Indians of any tribe have been granted
individual ownership of property, they have almost invariably been
induced to sell it to sharpers and heartless men.”290 It is somewhat
meaningful that this report was issued in 1873, the same year that
the Supreme Court, in upholding a law prohibiting women from
practicing law, stated “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of
women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator . . . in view of the peculiar
286. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
287. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
288. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION
FRAUD, H.R Rep. No. 42-98 (3d Sess. 1873).
289. Id. at 1.
290. Id. at 23.
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characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the
province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and
callings shall be filled and discharged by men.”291
Just as it is the case with women, society’s views of Indians
have evolved since 1873. Yet unlike with women, while the statutes
imposing all kinds of restrictions on Indians have been amended,
they have never been overturned or repealed, and some of the old
restrictions are still the law. I believe that a search of the legislative
history of the various acts of Congress imposing restrictions on
tribal management decisions would find that many of these
restrictions have their origins in legislation with purposes that are
no longer legitimate, or have restrictions which cannot be rationally
tied to a legitimate governmental purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Indian tribes and their members are probably the only
entities and people who are subject to federal restrictions on the
management of their own lands because of their status. While the
law prevented Indians from successfully challenging these
restrictions on equal protection grounds, recent development in
equal protection jurisprudence has opened new possibilities. This
article has argued that while congressional restrictions imposed on
Indians pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause do not create
racial classifications, these laws can be successfully challenged on
equal protection grounds alleging that they were either enacted
pursuant to unconstitutional animus or are not rationally tied to the
true congressional purpose behind the legislation. While legislating
for the benefit of the tribes pursuant to the trust relationship can
provide a legitimate governmental purpose for such laws, each law
should be evaluated on its own merit. Laws imposing federal
restrictions without any trust obligations creating potential liability
for their breach, as was the case in the Navajo Nation’s breach of
trust case, should not be considered as having been enacted for the
benefit of the Indians pursuant to the trust relationship.
291.
concurring).

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J.

